Abstract: The paper addresses the issue of optimal investments in innovations. As an example, investments in the construction of gas pipelines are considered. Rational decisions in choosing the commercialization times (stopping times) can be associated with Nash equilibria in a game between the projects. In this game, the total benefits gained during the pipelines' life periods act as payoffs and commercialization times as strategies. The goal of this paper is to characterize multiequilibria in the game of timing. The case of two players is studied in detail. A key point in the analysis is the observation that all player's best response commercialization times concentrate at two instants that are fixed in advance. This reduces decisionmaking to choosing between two fixed investment policies, fast and slow, with the prescribed commercialization times. A description of a computational algorithm that finds all the Nash equilibria composed of fast and slow scenarios concludes the paper.
INTRODUCTION
If several large-scale gas pipeline projects compete for a new gas market, the choices of the commercialization times (stopping times), i.e., the times of finalizing the construction of the pipelines, determine the future structure of the market and thus become especially important. In the paper (Klaassen 1 This author was supported by the Russian Fund for Fundamental Research, Grant 00-01-00682. 2This author was supported by the Russian Fund for Fundamental Research, Grant 02-01-00769, and the Program for the Sponsorship of Leading Scientific Schools, Grant 00- 15-96057. 193 et al., 2001b) , which motivated the present study, a detailed pipeline model based on classical patterns of mathematical economics (see (Arrow and Kurz, 1970) , (Intriligator, 1971) ) was designed and a best reply dynamic adaptation algorithm originating from the theory of evolutionary games (see (Friedman, 1991) - (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988) , (Kaniovski et aI., 2000) , (Kryazhimskii and Osipov, 1995) - (Kryazhimskii et aI., 2(01) , (Tarasyev, 1999) ) was used to estimate numerically the commercialization times for the pipeline projects competing nowadays for the Turkey gas market. the projects. We study the structure of this game in terms of game theory (see (Basar and Olsder, 1982) , (Vorob'ev, 1977» . A background of the gas infrastructure model (see (Klaassen et al., 2001a» and constructions of the optimal timing problem (see (Barzel, 1968) , (Tarasyev and Watanabe, 2(01» are employed. The model takes into account the stages of construction and exploitation of the gas pipelines. In each level, the model is optimized and estimated using appropriate techniques of theory of optimal control and theory of differential games (see (Chernousko, 1994) , (Krasovskii and Subbotin, 1988) , (Pontryagin et al., 1962» . At the stage of exploitation, as gas supply policies compete on market, decisionmaking is relatively clear: the competitors search for an equilibrium supply at any instant. We focus, therefore, on the stage of construction, at which investment policies compete and decisionmaking is concerned with strong long-term aftereffects. The competitors interact through choosing their commercialization times. A proper individual choice is the best response to the choices of the other competitor. Therefore, a pair of commercialization times is suitable to every competitor if and only if the commercialization time of every competitor responds best to the commercialization time of the other competitor. Such situations constitute Nash equilibria in the game under consideration. In this game, the total benefits gained during the pipelines' life periods act as payoffs and commercialization times act as strategies. Our goal is to characterize the equilibria in this game of timing. A key point in the analysis is the observation that all player's best response commercialization times concentrate at two instants that are fixed in advance. This reduces decisionmaking to choosing between two fixed investment policies, fast and slow, with the prescribed commercialization times. We describe an algorithm that finds all the Nash equilibria in the game of timing. We give results of the model-based analysis for two case studies: competing gas pipeline projects in the Caspian region, and the planned pipeline routes to the gas market in China.
GAME OF TIMING
We construct a game-theoretic model of competition of two gas pipeline projects. We associate players 1 and 2 with the investors of projects 1 and 2, respectively. Assuming that the starting time for making investments is 0, we consider virtual positive commercialization times of projects 1 and 2 (i.e., the final times of the construction of the pipelines), t l and t2. Given a commercialization time, ti, player i (i = 1,2) can estimate the cost, Ci(ti), for finalizing project i at time ti. The positive-valued cost functions Ci(ti) (i = 1,2) are defined on the positive half-axis.
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Assumption 2.1. For each player, i, the cost function, Ci(ti), is smooth, monotonicaIIy decreasing and convex.
In what follows, the rate of cost reduction for player i is understood as the positive-valued monotonically decreasing function
At any time t > 0, the price of gas and costs for extraction and transportation of gas determine the benefit rate of player I, b l (t). The costs for extraction and transportation of gas do not depend on the state of project 2, whereas the price of gas depends on the presence of player 2 on the marketplace. Hence, the benefit rate b l (t) may take two values, upper -b u (t), and lower -b I2 (t),
Similarly, we introduce the upper and lower benefit rates of player 2 at time t, b 21 (t) and b 22 (t),
We assume that the positive-valued upper and lower benefit rates b il (t) and b i2 (t) (i = 1, 2) are continuous functions defined on the positive half-axis.
Assumption 2.2. For every player i (i = 1,2), the graph of the rate of cost reduction, ai (t) , intersects the graph of the upper benefit rate, b il (t) , from above at the unique point ti > 0, and stays below it afterwards; similarly, the graph of ai(t) intersects the graph of b i2 (t) from above at the unique point tt > 0, and stays below it afterwards.
It is clear that (4)
Denote by t2 the commercialization time of player 2. The benefit rate of player I, b l (t), equals b ll (t) for t < t2 and equals b l2 (t) for t~t2. We stress the dependence of b l (t) on t2 and write b l (tlt2) instead ofbl(t)
Similarly, a commercialization time tl of project determines the benefit rate of player 2 as
Given a commercialization time of player I, tl, and a commercialization time of player 2, t2, the total benefits of the players are represented by the integrals
lt2 Assumption 2.3. For every positive t l and every positive t2 the integrals B i (tl, t2) (i = 1,2) are finite.
Given commercialization times of the players, t l and t2, the total profit of player i is defined as
We define the game of timing for players 1 and 2 in line with the standards of game theory (see (Vorob'ev, 1977) ). In the game of timing, the strategies of player i (i = 1,2) are the positive commercialization times, ti, for project i, and the payoff to player i, thanks to strategies tl and t2 of players 1 and 2, respectively, is the total profit Pi(tl, t2)'
NASH EQUILIBRIA
According to the standard terminology of game theory, a strategy ti of player 1 is said to be a best response of player 1 to a strategy t2 of player 2 if ti maximizes the payoff to player 1, PI (tl, t2) , over the set of all strategies of player 1, t l :
Similarly, a strategy ti of player 2 is said to be a best response of player 2 to a strategy tl of player I if ti maximizes the payoff to player 2, P 2 (t l , t2), over the set of all strategies of player 2, t2:
Any pair (ti , ti) , where ti is a best response of player 1 to ti and ti is a best response of player 2 to ti, is said to be a Nash equilibrium in the game of timing.
Our goal is to characterize the Nash equilibria in the game of timing. We start with analysis of the payoffs. The differentiation of PI (t l , t2) with respect to t l yields Let us take two arbitrary strategies of player 2, t21 and t22 > t21· As (9) shows,
for tl < t2I and for tl > tn, and
for t2I < t l < t22. We have stated that beyond the time interval located between t21 and t22, PI (tl, t22) and PI (t l , t2d have the same rate in t l , and within this interval PI (t l , t22) PI (t l , t2) in the set of all positive tl are restricted to the two-element set {t l ,tt}.
Let us identify the actual maximizers in this set. The set of all best responses of player 2 to £1 is {t2",tt}.IfO < t 1 < £1, then the unique best response of player 2 to t1 is tt· If t1 > £1, then the unique best response of player 2 to t 1 is t2".
We call t2" the fast choice of player 2, tt the slow choice of player 2, and £2 the switch point for player 2.
We also introduce the best response function of player 2, which associates to each strategy, t I , of player 1 the set of all best responses of player 2 to t 1. The graph of the best response function of player 2 consists of the vertical segment located to the right of the segment (0, £1] on the t1 -axis at distance tt, and the unbounded vertical segment located to the right of the segment [£1,00) on the t 1 -axis at distance t2" . Points -+ -(t1, t 2 ) and (tI, t2") lie on the graph.
Nash equilibria (ti, t 2 ) belong to the intersection of the graphs of the best response functions of players 1 and 2 and are characterized by the following relations -
Proposition 3.5. In cases (14), (15) and (19) the unique Nash equilibrium is slow-fast, (tl' tt). In cases (16), (20) and (21) the unique Nash equilibrium is fast-slow, (ti , t2"). In cases (17) and (18) the game of timing has precisely two Nash equilibria, fast-slow, (tl' tt), and slow-fast, (ti, t2").
Proposition 3.6. Let the game of timing have two Nash equilibria, i.e., (17) or (18) hold. Then (i) PI (tl' tt)~PI (tt, t2") , moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if £2 < tt;
(ii) P 2 (tl' tt)~P2 (tt, t2") , moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if £1 < tt.
We conclude the general part of our study with the description of an algorithm that finds the Nash equilibria in the game of timing.
Step 1. Use definitions for finding the players' fast and slow choices, ti, tt (i = 1,2).
Step 2. Use definitions (12) and (13) for finding the players' switch times, ii (i = 1, 2).
Step 3. Use Proposition 3.5 for identifying the Nash equilibria.
2. The rate of cost reduction, ai(ti), is given by
4. GAS PIPELINE GAME
We apply the suggested solution method to a model described in (Klaassen et aI., 200lb) .
The cost Ci(ti) for finalizing the construction of pipeline i (i = 1,2) at time ti is defined to be the minimum of the integral investments
Here A is a positive discount. An investment strategy of player i is modeled as an integrable control function, 
The dynamics of Xi(t) is modeled as
Xi(t) = -O"Xi(t) + T;(t).
Here 0" is a positive obsolescence coefficient and, (0 < , < 1) is a delay parameter.
In the supply game arising at time t, the strategies of player i are nonnegative rates of supply, Yi, and the payoff to player i is defined as
Here Y is the total rate of supply, 1r(t, y) is the price of gas and Ci(t) > 0 is the cost for extraction and transportation of gas for player i. The price of gas is modeled as
where g(t) > 0 is the consumer's GDP at time t and f3 (0 < f3 < 1) is the inverse to the price elasticity of gas demand.
where ( 
i -A + ye-pt '3 .
for j = 1,2 respectively.
We assume that g(t) and Ci(t) (i = 1,2) are given by (33) and inequality (34) For these parameters there exist two Nash equilibria in the game of timing, the fast-slow equilibrium (t 1 ,tt) = (2002.8,2005.2) , and the slow-fast equilibrium (tt, t z )= (2004.6,2002 .2).
Our second case study is related to the planned projects of gas pipelines from Russia to China. Two potential competitors on the North China gas market are the "Kovikta-Zabaikalsk-Kharbin" pipeline In this case study there exists the unique, slow-fast, Nash equilibrium (tt, t z )= (2003.6,2002) .
CONCLUSIONS
The paper is devoted to the analysis of a twoplayer game, in which the players' strategies are times of terminating innovation processes. In the game between the projects the total profits act as payoffs and commercialization times as strategies. The analysis of the game leads to the restriction of player's rational choices to no more than two prescribed combinations of commercialization times, which constitute the Nash equilibria in the game. Typically, two Nash equilibria arise and the projects compete for a fast commercialization scenario; its complement, a slow commercialization scenario, is 198 less profitable, representing the best response to the fast scenario of the competitor. An algorithm for finding the Nash equilibria is described.
